General Intervention by H.E. Himalee Arunatilaka, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the UN in Geneva, on 28 August 2023
Mr. Chair,
Sri Lanka compliments the work accomplished by you as the Chair of this open-ended working group to date, based on the mandate given by General Assembly resolution 76/231. We are thankful to all Member States for their constructive engagement throughout the past sessions towards reaching a substantive outcome of this working group.
Mr. Chair,
Sri Lanka recognizes the common interest of humankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Sri Lanka has been actively engaging in multilateral efforts for the prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) over many decades since becoming a signatory to the Outer Space Treaty in 1967. Significantly, Sri Lanka proposed a moratorium on the testing and development of space weapons preceding multilateral negotiations on a treaty to prohibit all weapons in space in 1985.
Intervention by Dr. Samiddhi Samarakoon, National Coordinator, Disaster Preparedness and Response Division of the Ministry of Health on National Inventory of Dangerous Pathogens (NIDP)
Thank you Mr. Chair,
I take this opportunity to brief on the background of the establishment of National Inventory of Dangerous Pathogens (NIDP) in Sri Lanka which is a key step in national implementation of the BWC. Following the Joint External Evaluation of International Health Regulations (IHR) implementation in 2017, while acknowledging the several activities that were undertaken to improve the biosafety and biosecurity in Sri Lanka, it was recommended to develop a National Inventory of Dangerous Pathogens and Toxins (NIDP) as well to further strengthen the biosafety and biosecurity in the country.
Thus, action was undertaken to develop the National Policy on Biosafety and Biosecurity, including policy statements required to satisfy the 15 Articles of the BWC; appointing two contact points including the National Coordinator, Disaster Preparedness and Response of the Ministry of Health. The Disaster Preparedness and Response Division (DPRD) of the Ministry of Health applied for extended assistance from the UNODA for implementation activities of BWC and BWC-ISU in collaboration with the National Institute of Public Health and the Environment (RVIM), of the Netherlands supported Sri Lanka to develop the NIDP. We are grateful to the Government of the Netherlands and UNODA for this assistance and the European Union (EU) for funding the project.
Intervention by Dr. Samiddhi Samarakoon, National Coordinator, Disaster Preparedness and Response Division of the Ministry of Health on the Implementation of Biological Weapons Convention Plan in Sri Lanka
Mr. Chair,
Thank you for giving me the floor. First of all, I would like to express sincere appreciation of Sri Lanka delegation for your steady stewardship of this Working Group. I also thank the ISU staff and the representatives of other international organizations for their presentations on important topics.
Sri Lanka has also been in the forefront of major initiatives in the field of disarmament and was among the very first countries to sign the BWC in 1972.
Intervention on the revised draft
Mr. Chair
Thank you very much for sharing this new draft.
Even though many delegations in this room argued for strengthening of the text in order to ensure that centrality of human control is retained in AWS in order to ensure compliance with international law and IHL in particular, we are quite concerned that the text in several ways is now even further weakened to the extent that we run the risk of even previously agreed understandings are backtracked. Our concerns are mainly with paragraph 20 such as deletion of the word ‘anticipation. Which we believe is already an IHL requirement as well as concerns regarding para 21 in this regard.
Adoption of a substantive repot is important for our delegation as much as it is the same for other delegations but we believe that it should be progressive and forward looking in nature.
Thank you Mr. Chair,
Our comments at this point are with regard to paragraph 25 on legal review. It is the understanding of our delegation that legal reviews with regard to autonomous weapon systems should be inline with the already existing obligations under Art. 36 of the Additional Protocol I and that we should not in anyway agree to obligations on legal review for autonomous weapon systems that are weaker than the already existing obligations under Art,36. It is also recalled that most provisions of the Additional Protocols have gained the status of customary international law. We also note that the obligation under Art 36 of the Additional Protocol I finds its basis in article 35 of the Protocol which provides that the right of states to choose means and methods of warfare is not unlimited.
Art. 36 requires to determine whether the employment of weapons, means and methods of warfare would, ‘in some or all circumstances’ be prohibited by international law. In this sense we believe that the legal review process should consider whether the use of an AWS is in compliance with international law “ in some or all circumstance” and we therefore suggest to make this change in the text. We also support the suggestion by the Swiss delegation as well the delegation of Ireland now to delete the words “ seek to” in this section.
With regard to paragraph 21 on limitations we would like to state at the outset that in our view the purpose of the imposition of these limitations is to ensure ‘ meaningful human control’ in weapon systems on the premise that autonomy in weapon system cannot be unlimited. We do not agree with the argument that the limitations imposed during the stages of development, deployment and use go beyond the existing IHL requirements. To the contrary these limitations are essential to ensure meaningful human control is retained in weapon systems which would be the only way to ensure in turn that these weapon systems in compliance with IHL.
The chapeau of paragraph 21 should refer to international law and to IHL in particular since complexity of these weapon systems pose a challenge not only to IHL but to the broader regime of international law. We also request to remove the qualifier ‘where appropriate’ in this section as these limitations should be upheld at all times. We stress once again the importance of these limitations as well as the prohibitions with regard to autonomous weapon systems codified in the form of a binding legal instrument to ensure their compliance rather than “possible voluntary measures” left for the discretionary implementation of national mechanisms.
- Second Session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, 15th May 2023
- 1st Session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems,6th March 2023 General Statement
- Address by H.E. Himalee Arunatilaka Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka at the Conference on Disarmament